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Random beacons—information sources that broadcast a stream of random digits unknown by
anyone beforehand—are useful for various cryptographic purposes. But such beacons can be easily
and undetectably sabotaged, so that their output is known beforehand by a dishonest party, who
can use this information to defeat the cryptographic protocols supposedly protected by the beacon.
We explore a strategy to reduce this hazard by combining the outputs from several noninteracting
(eg spacelike-separated) beacons by XORing them together to produce a single digit stream which
is more trustworthy than any individual beacon, being random and unpredictable if at least one
of the contributing beacons is honest. If the contributing beacons are not spacelike separated, so
that a dishonest beacon can overhear and adapt to earlier outputs of other beacons, the beacons’
trustworthiness can still be enhanced to a lesser extent by a time sharing strategy. We point out
some disadvantages of alternative trust amplification methods based on one-way hash functions.
A. Introduction
In cryptography and distributed computing, a ran-
dom beacon is a trusted information source (eg a radio
transmitter) that periodically broadcasts a random signal
which is unknown to anyone before the time of broad-
cast but becomes known to everyone thereafter. Bea-
cons were originally proposed by Rabin [1] to facilitate
remote transactions such as contract signing. Bennett,
DiVincenzo and Linsker [2] (cf. Fig. 1) proposed using a
trusted random beacon to help authenticate video record-
ings, made by untrusted recording apparatus operated
by untrusted personnel, against falsification of the time
or content (see Figure 1). These two applications re-
quire only a low information rate (eg kHz), and assume
that the history of previously emitted signals becomes
a matter of public record, being stored at the beacon
and/or other independent locations to help resolve dis-
putes. More recently, Aumann and Rabin [3] have pro-
posed using a much higher bandwidth beacon (eg GHz to
THz) to permit informationally secure encryption. The
security of this scheme depends on the beacon’s informa-
tion rate being so great that no one can feasibly store the
history of its previously emitted signals.
The Achilles’ heel of beacons is the need for users to
trust that they have not been sabotaged. A dishonest
beacon operator can intentionally substitute pseudoran-
dom digits, or true random digits generated much earlier
and leaked to accomplices, for the supposedly fresh ran-
dom digits being emitted by the beacon. Even if the
operator is honest, a dishonest hardware supplier could
have concealed a tiny clandestine pseudorandom gen-
erator (PSRG) in the supposed true random generator
(TRG) hardware used by the beacon, causing the hard-
ware’s output to be largely predictable. To avoid de-
tection, such a hardware saboteur should not make the
output wholly deterministic, because this would lead to
the sabotaged generator issuing the same digit stream
T r u s t e d  B e a c o n
s o u r c e  o f  r a n d o m
c h a l l e n g e s
C a m e r a
 S c e n e  o r  
E v e n t  b e i n g
 R e c o r d e d
2 - w a y  l o w -
b a n d w i t h
l i n k
C h a l l e n g e -
c o n t r o l l e d
l a s e r  s c a n
r a n d o m
c h a l l e n g e s
h a s h e d
d i g e s t s
S u b s e q u e n t
V a l i d a t i o n  o f
T a p e  a g a i n s t
D i g e s t s
I n s e c u r e S t o r a g e  a n d  D e l i v e r y  o f  T a p e ,  
a l l o w i n g  u n l i m i t e d  t i m e  f o r  t a m p e r i n g .
U n g u a r d e d
D i g i t a l  T a p e
U n t r u s t e d
R e c o r d i n g  
E q u i p m e n t  
a n d  P e r s o n n e l  
T r u s t e d  R e p o s i t o r y  
f o r  h a s h e d  d i g e s t s
h
FIG. 1. Time-bracketed video authentication uses periodic
“challenge” signals from a trusted random source to influ-
ence the scene being recorded (e.g. by a challenge-controlled
laser scan), and shortly thereafter returns a hashed digest of
the scene, including the effect of the challenge, to a trusted
repository. The digests are produced by applying a secure
hash function h to the current digital image data). The time
bracketing prevents pre- or post-dating, and provides evidence
that the action actually took place, as opposed to having been
computationally simulated in real time or assembled from
prerecorded material. Dishonest personnel can destroy the
videotape, or can prevent it from being recorded in the first
place, but so long as the beacon and repository remain hon-
est, they cannot easily produce a faked video that will match
the archived digests.
every time it was turned on. Rather the sabotaged gen-
erator might take its first few hundred digits from the
TRG, then use these as a seed for the concealed PSRG
to generate the rest of the sequence deterministically. An
accomplice, knowing the nature of the sabotage, could
then monitor the first few hundred digits of beacon out-
put and use these to predict all the rest. To help ac-
complices who had missed the initial beacon output, the
saboteur could use a steganographic reseeding strategy,
for example whenever a particular random 40-bit string
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appeared in the beacon output, it would signal that the
next 200 bits were not pseudorandom, but true random
bits being used to reseed the concealed PSRG.
One might hope that these various sabotages, at least
the ones involving pseudorandom generators, could be
detected by post-facto analysis of the corrupted digit
stream; but this hope is probably vain, as it is widely
believed that there exist “cryptographically strong” pseu-
dorandom generators which, when seeded with a random
n-bit seed, produce an output stream that cannot be dis-
tinguished from true random digits in time polynomial
in n.
In view of the ease of sabotaging beacons and the dif-
ficulty of detecting that they have been sabotaged, the
main hope for beacon users would appear to lie in pro-
tocols that amplify trust by combining the outputs of
several spatially and administratively separated beacons,
in the reasonable expectation that they only a few of
them have been sabotaged. Henceforth we will consider
a set of n nominally but not exactly synchronized bea-
cons B1...Bn, each of which emits digits from an ℓ letter
alphabet at regular intervals. Some beacons are are hon-
est and some dishonest (sabotaged), and we assume that
the dishonest subset does not change with time. We will
consider protocols for trust amplification by users who
have access to the outputs of all the beacons.
An important consideration is whether the user, who
combines the output of several beacons to produce some
resultant sequence, is honest or dishonest. These two
premises are profoundly different, and give rise to quite
different protocols. An honest user strives to produce a
resultant sequence that is random and unpredictable by
accomplices of the dishonest beacons, despite not know-
ing which these are. A dishonest user, by contrast, knows
the identities of the dishonest beacons, and conspires
with them to produce a predictable resultant sequence,
despite the unpredictability of the outputs of the honest
beacons. A dishonest-user protocol is considered suc-
cessful if it defeats this conspiracy, forcing the resultant
sequence to be unpredictable even though the dishonest
user is trying to make it predictable. This is the relevant
premise for time-bracketed video authentication, whose
goal is to prevent a potentially dishonest camera manu-
facturer and operator from producing a video that has
been undetectably falsified as to its time or content.
One might ask why an honest user needs any beacon
at all: if he is assumed to be honest, why can’t he gen-
erate his own random numbers, in effect being a beacon
unto himself? One possible answer is that he may lack
the physical capacity to produce random numbers, or to
produce them as fast as he desires, without drawing on
external sources of randomness. In passing we note that
an honest user, having a low-rate random source in his
own lab, can use an extractor (cf. [5], to distill certifiably
unpredictable high-rate random numbers from the low-
rate private source and a collection of high-rate random
beacons, only some of which are honest.
The remainder of this paper will concern dishonest-
user protocols of the kind relevant for beacons to be used
in time-bracketed authentication.
Vazirani [4] considered the related problem of devising
protocols to extract nearly unbiased random bits from
two beacons, both dishonest and colluding, but neither
entirely controllable by its operator. Here, by contrast,
we have some beacons that are entirely controllable by
colluding dishonest operators, and others that are en-
tirely random and honest, but the designer of the proto-
col doesn’t know which.
B. Trust amplification for beacons that are spacelike
separated or otherwise known to be incapable of
influencing one another
Trust amplification works best when the beacons are
known to be incapable of influencing one another, so the
dishonest beacons cannot adapt their output to that of
the honest ones. This will be assured if the beacons’
emissions are so well synchronized, compared to the dis-
tance between them, as to be spacelike separated in the
sense of special relativity. Two beacons, say B1 and B2,
are said to be spacelike separated when for all integer i
the spacetime event E(i, B1) occurs at a spacelike inter-
val from the spacetime event E(i, B2); in other words, a
light signal starting at beacon B1 at the instant when it
emits its i′th digit B1(i) will not have arrived at beacon
B2 by the time beacon B2 emits its i’th digit B2(i), and
similarly with the indices 2 and 1 reversed. Under these
conditions, it is evident that the XOR (or more generally
the mod-ℓ sum ⊕, for an ℓ-letter alphabet) of the two
beacons, ie the digit stream B1(i) ⊕ B2(i), will be ran-
dom iff at least one of constituent beacons is random. ∗
For a beacon to be trustworthy, its output must not
only be random, but also unpredictable before the time
it is supposed to become public. In general the informa-
tion from any given beacon does not become available
to everyone simultaneously, owing to propagation delays,
which can never be less than the distance of the observer
from the beacon divided by the velocity of light c. For
example, in the case of two synchronized honest beacons
separated by distance d, an observer midway between the
beacons would learn B1(i) and B2(i), and could compute
RXOR(i), at a time d/2v after the emission time of the
i’th digit, where v ≤ c is the signal propagation velocity.
An observer at either beacon would have to wait a little
∗Even without spacelike separation, noninteraction can
sometimes be assured, with lesser confidence, by shielding
or isolating each potentially dishonest beacon well enough to
block significant incoming signals from the honest beacons.
However, unless otherwise noted, we will henceforth assume
that the beacons are not shielded or isolated, and that unless
two beacons are spacelike separated the later one, if dishonest,
can overhear and adapt to the signals of the earlier one.
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longer, until time d/v, to obtain the signal from the other
beacon. These considerations may be summarized in the
following proposition, whose proof is obvious:
If B1...Bn is a set of spacelike separated beacons, at
least one of which is honest,
1. the modular sum
RXOR(i) =
n⊕
k=1
Bk(i) (1)
is random,
2. RXOR(i) is unpredictable from the viewpoint of
any observer outside the intersection of the forward
light cones of the honest subset of beacons.
3. assuming that signals propagate at light speed,
RXOR(i) can be correctly calculated by any ob-
server inside the intersection of the forward light
cones of all the beacons.
The principal effect of dishonesty is thus to create a
region of spacetime within which RXOR(i) is predictable
to accomplices of the dishonest beacons, but not to the
general public. This region consists of points within the
forward light cone of every honest beacon, but outside
the forward light cone of at least one dishonest beacon.
C. Trust amplification for beacons that are timelike
separated or otherwise suspected of influencing one
another
Within any nominally synchronized set of beacons
there may be enough timing error that the beacons are
not in fact spacelike separated. Lack of spacelike sepa-
ration can seriously impair the trustworthiness of the re-
sultant sequence RXOR(i), making it untrustworthy over
all spacetime, not just in a limited region. For exam-
ple, suppose that beacon B1 is so late that it has all
the other beacons in its past light cone. Then, if B1 is
sabotaged, it can adapt its output B1(i) so as to force
the resultant RXOR(i) not to be random, but to take on
a predetermined value, perhaps chosen long beforehand.
Thus the accomplices of the dishonest beacon potentially
know RXOR(i) wherever they sit in spacetime, while hon-
est players, as before, will only know RXOR(i) if they sit
within the intersection of the future light cones of all the
beacons, which in this case is simply the future light cone
of B1.
In the worst case, where one beacon is consistently so
late as to have all the others in its past light cone, the
XOR of all the beacons is no more trustworthy than the
single latest beacon taken by itself. However, one can still
gain some increased trust by combining the beacons in a
different fashion, which we call the time-sharing protocol.
Here the resultant is defined to be a cyclicly chosen one
of the original beacons,
RTS(i) = Bimodn(i). (2)
If some of the beacons are honest and some dishonest,
then some digits of the resultant sequence RTS will be
predictable by accomplices of the dishonest beacons and
others will be unpredictable. The resultant sequence is
thus sure to be partly unpredictable, while the sequence
from any individual beacon, or the XOR of all of them,
has some chance of being wholly predictable. For pur-
poses such as time-bracketed authentication [2], a se-
quence that is sure to be at least partly unpredictable
is still usable, though not as good as a wholly unpre-
dictable sequence; but a sequence that has some chance
of being be wholly predictable is unusable.
The sort of uncertain unpredictability relevant to time-
bracketed authentication can be quantified by the per-
character min entropy, ie the logarithm of the probabil-
ity (as seen by the dishonest users) of the most likely
resultant sequence RTS(i), divided by the length of the
sequence. If there are n timelike separated beacons, k
of which at random are sabotaged but we don’t know
which, then the min entropy of RTS is ((n − k)/n) log ℓ
bits per character. On the other hand, each individual
beacon, say B1, or the XOR of all the beacons if B1 is
the latest, has a per-character min entropy approaching
zero, because B1’s min entropy is dominated by the prob-
ability k/n that it is sabotaged, and so emits a sequence
that is completely predictable by dishonest users.
The advantage of using min entropy can be seen by not-
ing that in this situation the ordinary Shannon entropies
of RTS and B1 are equal, both being ((n−k)/n) log ℓ bits
per character. Thus min entropy heavily and properly pe-
nalizes any chance of complete predictability, while Shan-
non entropy allows it to hide amidst the unpredictability
of other cases.
The superiority of spacelike separation, and the advan-
tage of using the RXOR instead of RTS when the beacons
are known to be spacelike separated, can be seen by com-
paring the per character min entropies in various cases.
beacon separation spacelike timelike
XOR protocol 1 0
Time sharing protocol (n−k)/n (n−k)/n
Table I. Per character min entropy of resultant sequences
RXOR and RTS obtained respectively by XOR and time-
sharing protocols for trust amplification. We assume n bea-
cons, an unknown k of which are dishonest. Entropies are
in units of log ℓ, the entropy of an honest beacon emitting
characters from an ℓ-letter alphabet.
In general the resultant sequences RXOR (for spacelike
separated beacons) or RTS (for any set of beacons) will
be at least partly unpredictable, and therefore usable for
purposes such as time bracketed authentication, except
when all the beacons are dishonest.
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D. Why it is not generally advantageous to combine
beacons by hashing
A seemingly attractive alternative to RXOR and RTS
would be to use a cryptographically strong, one-way hash
function h to combine the beacons,eg
Rh(i) = h(B1(i), B2(i)...Bn(i)), (3)
where h is an m-to-1 mapping on characters from an ℓ-
letter alphabet; but, as we shall show, Rh has significant
weaknesses compared to RXOR and RTS . For concrete-
ness consider the case where there are m = 2 beacons,
an unknown one of which is dishonest, and where each
beacon broadcasts letters from an ℓ = 2d letter alphabet,
so that Rh may be viewed as a pseudorandom mapping
from a pairs of d-bit strings to a single d-bit string. In the
following we will use lower case letters x, y etc to denote
d-bit strings.
If the two beacons are spacelike separated, or otherwise
known to be noninteracting, RXOR will perfectly random
and unpredictable. By contrast, as we will show, a dis-
honest beacon operator with a lot of computing power
(whom we will call Eve) can force Rh to be significantly
nonrandom, for example forcing its first bit to be almost
always zero. Assume, without loss of generality, that Eve
is operating B1. She then finds, by brute force search,
some string x† defined to be any d-bit string x on which
the set {y : h(x, y) begins with 1} has minimal cardi-
nality. This minimal cardinality will be of order unity,
so if Eve always broadcasts x† as her maliciously chosen
output from B1, while the honest beacon B2 broadcasts
random d-bit strings, the first bit of Rh(x
†, y) will al-
most always be 0. Similarly Eve can force the value of
any other single digit of Rh, or strongly bias several dig-
its of her choosing. Under the more realistic assumption
that Eve has limited computing power, she cannot ap-
preciably bias Rh, so it is no better and no worse than
RXOR.
If the beacons are timelike separated, with dishonest
beacon B1 later so it can overhear honest beacon B2, a
computationally powerful Eve can force the almost all
the digits of h to agree with a particular string z0 of her
choosing. To do so, she waits till she has heard the par-
ticular string y broadcast by B2, then chooses her string
x‡ to be one that minimizes the Hamming distance be-
tween z0 and h(x, y). Often (about 1/e of the time) she
can obtain an exact hit h(x‡, y) = z0; in other case she
can almost certainly find an x‡ for which h(x‡, y) differs
from the target z0 in only one bit. Under the more re-
alistic assumption of limited computing power, Eve can
force the values of m ≈ several dozen bits of her choos-
ing in Rh. To do so she waits till she overhears y, then
proceeds by trial and error, evaluating h(x, y) for 2m ran-
dom x values, until she finds one, x∗ such that the first
m digits, or any other set of m digits of her choosing in
Rh(x
∗, y), have the values she wants. The computational
effort is exponential in the number of digits she wishes to
force. For small string lengths d, an Eve with moderate
computing power can force all the digits of Rh, making
it totally insecure. For large d, this is no longer possi-
ble, and RTS and Rh offer two somewhat different kinds
of partial unpredictability. With Rh such an Eve can
force a small fraction of the digits in the output stream,
digits of her choosing, while the others remain unpre-
dictable. With with RTS Eve can force half the digits
in the output stream, but has no control over which dig-
its these are. Depending on the beacon application, one
or another kind of partial predictability may be prefer-
able. For time-bracketed authentication, it is probably
better to use RTS , because a few absolutely uncontrol-
lable challenges are probably harder for a would-be forger
to simulate than a greater number of partly-controllable
challenges.
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